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War for the Seals:
The Canadian Seal Controversy
and Sociological Warfare
Introduction
	 The	annual	killing	of	tens	of	thousands	of	Harp	seals	northeast	of	Newfound-
land	(the	“Front”)	and	the	Gulf	of	St.	Lawrence	(the	“Gulf ”)	(otherwise	known	
as	 the	“Seal	Hunt”)	 in	 late	February	and	early	March	has	 long	history	and	has	
more	recently	become	a	source	of	significant	controversy.	Barry	(2005)	states	that	
French	explorer	Jacques	Cartier	observed	seal	hunting	in	the	Strait	of	Belle	Isle	in	
1534;	native	populations	had	been	hunting	seals	in	these	areas	for	a	significantly	
longer	period	(see	Wenzel,	1991).	During	European	colonization,	 the	fur	 trade,	
including	seal	pelts,	was	a	significant	economic	resource	for	many	in	the	colonies	
and	in	Britain	and	France.	The	hunting	of	seals	accelerated	during	the	late	eigh-
teenth	century	with	the	creation	of	vessels	capable	of	taking	seal	hunters	to	ice	
floe	breeding	areas.	This	led	to	seal	hunting	(or	“sealing”)	becoming	a	significant	
employer	in	Atlantic	Canada,	with	an	estimated	400,000	pelts	being	produced,	but	
then	subsequently	declining	after	the	seal	population	was	overexploited	(Daoust,	
et.	al	2002,	p.	687).	While	Daoust	et.al	(2002)	state	that	ethical	concerns	regarding	
animal	welfare	with	the	seal	hunt	were	raised	as	early	as	the	nineteenth	century,	
the	seal	hunt	became	internationally	controversial	during	the	1960s.	The	release	
of	a	film	in	1964	(ironically	produced	to	promote	the	seal	hunt	or	“sealing”)	(Lee,	
1988,	p.	21)	sparked	international	outrage	that	resulted	in	legal	attempts	to	curtail	
or	 terminate	 the	hunt,	 direct	 actions	by	protesters	 (including	attempts	 to	block	
sealing	vessels),	and	economic	boycotts	of	both	products	derived	from	seals	and	
Canadian	products	in	general.	Anti-seal	activities	led	by	the	International	Fund	for	
Animal	Welfare	(IFAW)	have	resulted	in	significant	public	attention	brought	via	
visual	media	to	the	graphic	nature	of	the	hunt	for	seal	pups	and	a	1983	ban	by	the	
European	Economic	Union	on	“seal	pup	skins	and	products,”	and	a	subsequent	
boycott	of	Canadian	fish	sales	in	Britain	and	the	United	States	led	to	a	1987	ban	
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on	the	hunting	of	harp	and	hooded	seal	pups	(Barry,	2005,	p.	2).	In	the	1990s	the	
seal	hunt	was	expanded	for	older	seals,	which	has	brought	both	additional	defense	
of	the	hunt	by	seal	hunters	as	being	necessary	for	both	their	livelihood	and	pre-
serving	the	dwindling	fish	populations	in	Atlantic	Canadian	waters.	Opponents	of	
the	seal	hunt	continue	to	argue	that	the	hunts	are	cruel,	make	marginal	economic	
contributions	to	the	Atlantic	Provinces,	and	are	environmentally	dubious	(including	
questioning	the	correlation	between	growing	seal	populations	and	dwindling	fish	
populations).	With	these	two	opposing	moral	points	of	view,	the	stage	is	set	for	an	
analysis	of	how	persuasive	efforts	impact	the	public	imagination.
Seal Hunts and Sociological Warfare
	 This	purpose	of	this	article	is	not	to	produce	a	chronology	of	the	Canadian	
seal	hunt	or	the	subsequent	protests	that	have	served	to	make	a	once	accepted	and	
widespread	practice	controversial.	Instead,	the	goal	of	this	article	is	to	illustrate	how	
the	sustained	controversy	over	the	Canadian	seal	hunt	is	an	example	of	what	will	be	
termed	“sociological	warfare.”	In	brief,	the	premise	of	“sociological	warfare”	is	a	
conflict	that	is	intended	to	alter	one	or	more	aspects	of	the	public	moral	imagination	
regarding	at	least	one	issue,	practice,	or	phenomena.	Sociological	warfare	is	distinct	
from	“psychological”	or	“political”	warfare.	Lasswell	(1958)	distinguishes	between	
psychological	and	political	warfare.	Psychological	warfare	at	its	most	elemental	
refers	to	the	utilization	of	“the means of mass communication in order to destroy 
the enemy’s will to fight”	(Lasswell,	in	Daugherty	&	Janowitz,	1958,	p.	22;	italics	
in	original).	Psychological	warfare	includes	typical	government	propaganda	(both	
visual	and	written)	as	well	as	 the	“propaganda	of	 the	deed”:	“a	 term	borrowed	
from	social	 revolutionaries,	which	 emphasized	 the	 importance	of	 assassinating	
or	the	taking	of	emotionally	significant	cities	or	the	importance	of	surprise	and	
the	cultivation	of	revolutionary	aims	against	enemy	governments”	(Lasswell,	in	
Daugherty	&	Janowitz,	1958,	p.	23).	Lasswell	argues	that	“political	warfare”	is	a	
more	inclusive	term,	which	“adds	the	important	idea	that	all	instruments	of	policy	
need	to	be	properly	correlated	in	the	conduct	of	war	“(Lasswell,	in	Daugherty	&	
Janowitz,	1958,	p.	24).	These	instruments	include	diplomacy	to	divide	internally	
and	externally	to	separate	an	enemy	from	potential	allies,	and	economic	activities	
intended	to	weaken	an	opponent.	Whereas	the	main	target	of	psychological	warfare	
is	the	“enemy’s	will	to	fight”,	the	targets	of	political	warfare	include	“allies,	neutrals	
and	the	home	audience”	in	support	of	the	war	effort	(Lasswell,	in	Daugherty	&	
Janowitz,	1958,	p.	24).	
	 These	terms	are	significant	because	they	emphasize	the	importance	of	ideological	
variables	within	armed	conflict	between	states	and	they	indicate	the	relative	limita-
tions	of	these	concepts	in	addressing	many	of	the	activities	of	social	movements,	
subcultures,	and	other	non-state	actors.	While	 the	activities	of	such	actors	may	
resemble	psychological	warfare	in	that	they	are	intended	to	encourage	an	opponent	
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to	withdraw	from	a	conflict	or	acquiesce,	or	political	warfare	in	that	they	involve	
attempts	to	persuade	third	parties	to	join	forces	and/or	abandon	a	former	ally	or	to	
divest	economic	resources.	However,	there	are	significant	limitations	to	these	terms	
when	applied	to	non-state	actors.	Firstly,	they	are	not	necessarily	part	of	an	actual	
or	potential	armed	conflict	(as	in	the	case	of	the	Cold	War).	Secondly,	non-state	
actors	generally	lack	the	communicative,	economic,	and	other	resources	of	states.	
Thirdly,	and	most	critically,	non-state	actors	tend	to	have	a	significant	difficulty	
regarding	legitimacy.	Unlike	political	or	psychological	warfare	between	states,	where	
much	of	propaganda	is	targeted	at	either	encouraging	existing	behavior	(such	as	
soldiers	fighting)	or	emphasizing	self-interest	(encouraging	enemy	combatants	to	
surrender	or	desert	a	cause	depicted	as	unworthy	or	unjust),	non-state	actors	(i.e.,	
activists	and	social	movements)	must	encourage	outsiders	of	the	legitimacy	of	their	
cause(s),	often	without	the	benefit	of	nationalism	or	other	existing	cultural	or	moral	
resources.	Moreover,	specific	conflicts	between	non-state	actors	and	others	often	
are	indicative	of	a	much	broader	clash	of	world	views.	For	example,	a	“fur-free	
Friday”	protest	by	animal	rights	activist	resembles	psychological	warfare	in	that	
the	protest	may	weaken	the	intentions	of	both	consumers	and	producers	to	possess	
or	market	fur	garments.	Such	protests	also	emphasize	a	central	claim	of	the	animal	
rights	movement:	the	killing	of	animals	for	their	fur	to	be	used	in	luxury	goods	
is	ethically	indefensible.	In	sum,	many	non-state	actors	are	advocating	ideals	and	
alternative	visions	of	social	life	that	are	not	paralleled	by	traditional	manifesta-
tions	of	psychological	warfare.	Such	protests	and	propaganda	campaigns	are	not	
simply	attempts	to	resolve	one	specific	matter	(such	as	the	sale	of	fur	garments)	
(see	Jasper	&	Nelkin,	1992),	but	are	also	advocating	an	alternative	consciousness	
(Gusfield,	1981)	towards	many	related	issues	which,	if	successfully	implemented	
would	dramatically	alter	the	social	landscape.	
Sociological Warfare and Sociological Propaganda
	 “Sociological	warfare”	parallel’s	Ellul’s	(1965)	distinction	between	political	
and	sociological	propaganda,	useful	because	it	emphasizes	the	difference	between	
intentional	persuasive	campaigns	conducted	by	a	specific	organization	or	institu-
tion	and	the	more	spontaneous	integrative	sociological	propaganda	that	collectively	
serves	“to	unify	its	members’	behavior	according	to	a	pattern,	to	spread	its	style	
of	life	abroad,	and	thus	to	impose	itself	on	other	groups…its	influence	aims	much	
more	at	an	entire	style	of	life	than	at	opinions	or	even	one	course	of	behavior”	(Ellul,	
1965,	pp.	62-63).	Ellul’s	view	of	sociological	propaganda	parallels	a	functional-
ist	perspective	on	the	creation	and	maintenance	of	a	unified	social	world	which	
manifests	a	common	way	of	life	despite	its	emergence	from	multiple	institutions	
and	social	practices.	
	 Over	time,	sociological	propaganda	emerges	from	multiple	sources,	such	as	
public	relations,	advertising	and	governmental	bodies,	to	create	“a	certain	general	
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conception	of	society,	a	particular	way	of	life”	that	is	supported	by	“propagated	
behavior	and	myths,	both	good	and	bad.	Furthermore,	such	propaganda	becomes	
increasingly	effective	when	those	subjected	to	it	accept	its	doctrines	on	what	is	
good	or	bad”	(Ellul,	1965,	p.	65).	In	short,	sociological	propaganda	transcends	
persuasive	efforts	related	to	concrete	behaviors	or	attitudes,	and	instead	promotes	
an	expansive	world	view	regarding	perceptions	of	the	desirable	and	undesirable.	
Such	an	expansive	perspective	that	acts	as	a	rubric	for	a	variety	of	distinct	issues	
and	concerns	is	critical	for	Ellul,	because	he	contends	that	it	is	the	mythic	vision,	
rather	than	specific	data	or	evidence,	which	is	ultimately	persuasive:
[W]hat	remains	with	the	individual	affected	by	this	propaganda	is	a	perfectly	irrational	
picture,	a	purely	emotional	feeling,	a	myth.	The	fact	isthe	data,	the	reasoning—all	are	
forgotten,	and	only	the	impression	remains.	And	this	is	indeed	what	the	propagandist	
ultimately	seeks,	for	the	individual	will	never	begin	to	act	on	the	basis	of	facts	or	
engage	in	purely	rational	behavior.	What	makes	him	act	is	the	emotional	pressure,	
the	vision	of	a	future,	the	myth.	The	problem	is	to	create	an	irrational	response	on	
the	basis	of	rational	and	factual	elements.	(Ellul,	1965,	pp.	86-87)	
	 Ellul’s	insight	is	central	for	sociological	warfare	because	it	implies	that	specific	
claims,	data,	or	evidence	will	be	unlikely	to	be	as	persuasive	as	compelling	nar-
ratives	and	myths.	While	claims-makers	necessarily	promote	compelling	factual	
evidence	in	efforts	to	both	shape	public	opinion	and	reinforce	existing	perspec-
tives,	Ellul	suggests	that	it	will	be	those	claims-makers	that	can	communicate	a	
broader	vision	alongside	compelling	evidence	that	will	be	more	successful	in	their	
persuasive	projects.	
Objectives of This Article
	 The	goal	of	this	article	is	to	examine	the	controversy	over	the	Canadian	Seal	
Hunt	as	an	episode	of	sociological	warfare,	with	each	group	of	combatants	intent	
on	altering	the	public	moral	imagination	regarding	the	status	of	the	hunt.	The	seal	
hunt	is	an	excellent	case	study	for	sociological	warfare	because	of	its	highly	medi-
ated	nature	and	its	inherent	ambiguity.	Most	Canadians	live	in	a	corridor	between	
Quebec	City,	Quebec	and	London,	Ontario	and	are	therefore	unlikely	to	accidentally	
encounter	the	seal	hunt;	international	audiences	are	unlikely	to	witness	the	seal	hunt	
unless	they	intentionally	travel	to	the	ice	foes	where	the	hunt	occurs.	Therefore,	
virtually	all	information	regarding	the	hunt	will	emanate	either	from	hunters	and	
government	agencies	which	support	the	hunt	or	from	anti-hunt	activists	intent	on	
truncating	or	eliminating	the	hunt—fertile	grounds	for	attempts	at	shaping	public	
perceptions.	Moreover,	even	well	intentioned	efforts	to	find	neutral	or	objective	
ground	on	the	seal	hunt	is	problematic	at	best.	As	Lee	(1988)	argues,	the	Canadian	
seal	hunt	lacks	any	“mediating	third	language”	with	which	to	discuss	the	hunt	(Lee,	
1988,	p.	21).	A	 term	such	as	“harvest”	characterizes	 seals	as	natural	 resources	
to	be	utilized	for	human	purposes,	but	conceals	the	violent	killings	inherent	in	a	
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“harvest”;	some	anti-seal	hunt	activists	contend	that	“hunt”	and	“kill”	belay	the	
“huge	slaughter”	that	anti-hunt	activists	perceive	as	self-evident	(Lee,	1988,	p.	24).	
As	with	other	cultural	controversies	(for	example,	see	Hunter,	1991),	the	lack	of	an	
overtly	neutral	language	will	necessarily	intensify	conflict,	especially	when	the	goal	
of	each	side	is	zero	sum:	moralization.	In	this	discussion	of	sociological	warfare	
and	moralization,	The Ottawa Citizen	was	sampled	for	articles	related	to	the	seal	
hunt.	Regulators	of	the	seal	hunt	and	its	economic	defenders,	as	well	as	anti-hunt	
advocates	(such	as	the	IFAW)	have	a	presence	in	Ottawa,	and	are	therefore	more	
likely	to	have	some	sort	of	hearing	in	The Ottawa Citizen.	
Moralization and the Canadian Seal Hunt
	 A	strategic	goal	of	sociological	warfare	is	moralization. Rozin’s	(1997)	dis-
cussion	of	moralization	begins	with	the	premise	that	“something	is	in	the	moral	
domain	if	the	term	ought	(or	ought not)	applies	to	it”…and	“that	if	something	is	
in	the	moral	domain	for	person	A,	then	A	is	concerned	that	other	people	hold	and	
behave	according	to	the	position	held	by	A”	(Rozin,	in	Brandt	&	Rozin,	1997,	p.	
380).	For	example,	Rozin	distinguishes	between	the	“pure	moral”	vegetarian	that	
“avoid	eating	meat	only	because	of	the	moral	implications	(killing	animals,	wast-
ing	resources,	and	so	on),	whereas	pure	health	vegetarians	avoid	eating	meat	on	
the	grounds	that	it	is	unhealthy”	(Rozin,	in	Brandt	&	Rozin,	1997,	p.	380).	Rozin	
contends	that	moralization	on	an	individual	unit	of	analysis	occurs	through	“moral	
piggybacking”	(“the	extension	of	an	existing	moral	principle	to	a	new	object/activ-
ity”)	and/or	through	“moral	expansion”	(which	“involves	creation	of	a	new	moral	
domain”)”	(Rozin,	in	Brandt	&	Rozin,	1997,	p.	386).	In	both	cases,	moralization	
occurs	through	either	an	affective route	(based	primarily	on	emotional	impact	and	
understandings,	such	as	a	person	becoming	disgusted	after	viewing	a	documentary	
of	how	animal	slaughter	is	conducted)	and/or	a	cognitive route	(based	primarily	on	
principles,	data,	or	other	information,	such	as	exposure	to	reasoned	and	principled	
arguments	about	why	the	slaughter	of	animals	is	morally	indefensible)	(Rozin,	in	
Brandt	&	Rozin,	1997,	pp.	385-386).	In	the	case	of	social	directions,	moralization	
may	occur	either	through	“moral	piggybacking”	when	a	person	is	either	affectively	
or	cognitively	persuaded	that	a	current	understanding	that	is	held	is	subsequently	
applied	to	another	context	(such	as	a	person	that	understands	killing	animals	for	
fur	is	immoral	comes	to	perceive	that	killing	animals	for	sport	is	also	immoral)	
or	through	“moral	expansion”(such	as	a	person	reading	Tom	Regan’s	The Case 
for Animal Rights	(1983)	and	coming	to	hold	the	new	understanding	that	animals	
should	not	be	killed	for	food	or	sport).
	 In	terms	of	social	factors	that	inhibit	or	encourage	moralization,	Rozin	cites	
nine	categories	of	“regularities”	or	conditions	that	encourage	or	discourage	mor-
alization,	which	will	be	divided	here	into	three	groups	based	on	the	point	of	socio-
logical	focus:	centrality of values and beliefs,	targeted populations and	structurally 
War for the Seals74
conducive or inhibiting societal conditions	(Rozin,	in	Brandt	&	Rozin,	1997,	pp.	
391-397).	In	the	case	of	centrality of values and beliefs,	these	“regularities”	focus	
on	beliefs	and	values	as	having	either	causal	primacy	or	significance	in	successful	
or	unsuccessful	moralization.	For	example,	countries	that	have	historically	been	
Protestant	are	more	likely	to	be	favorable	grounds	for	values	or	beliefs	that	empha-
size	the	importance	of	self-control	explaining	individual	and	collective	benefits	or	
calamities	(such	as	economic	prosperity	as	the	product	of	individual	exertion	and	
impoverished	populations	lacking	the	appropriate	“work	ethic”	(see	Pimpare,	2004).	
Moreover,	these	regularities	also	suggest	that	attempts	at	moralization	which	mesh	
with	previously	held	values,	beliefs,	and	perceptions	are	more	likely	to	be	success-
ful	than	those	which	are	qualitatively	innovative	and/or	challenge	previously	held	
values,	beliefs,	and	perceptions.	Targeted populations	refers	to	moralization	that	is	
encouraged	because	moral	claims	are	attached	to	sympathetic	populations	(such	as	
children)	or	conversely	to	populations	which	are	perceived	as	dangerous,	immoral,	
or	otherwise	contaminated	(such	as	nineteenth	century	immigrant	populations	in	
the	United	States,	whose	consumption	of	alcohol	was	understood	as	being	threat-
ening	to	longstanding	American	values	and	therefore	needed	to	be	controlled	(see	
Morone,	2003).	Regularities	under	the	rubric	of	structurally conducive or inhibiting 
societal conditions	suggest	that	moralization	is	more	likely	to	occur	with	practices	
when	behavioral	changes	exert	less	costs	due	to	larger	structural	conditions	(such	
as	public	“No	Smoking”	prohibitions	making	quitting	smoking	more	feasible	and	
that	cultural	and/or	societal	upheaval	make	individual	or	systematic	attempts	at	
moralization	more	 likely	 (such	 as	 the	 advent	 of	 “secular	morality”)	 (Rozin,	 in	
Brandt	&	Rozin,	1997,	p.	397).
Economics, Cruelty, and Moralization
	 Rozin’s	discussion	of	moralization	is	very	useful	for	an	analysis	of	the	contro-
versy	over	the	Canadian	seal	hunt	because	it	is	a	central	strategic	goal	of	sociological	
warfare.	Each	group	of	claims-makers	must	frame	(Snow	&	Bedford,	1988)	the	
controversy	in	order	 to	emphasize	the	moral	significance	and	propriety	of	 their	
stance,	and	the	untenable	moral	stance	of	their	opponents.	In	brief,	defenders	of	
the	Canadian	seal	hunt	postulate	that	the	hunt	provides	needed	revenue	for	both	the	
participants	and	Atlantic	Canada,	is	environmentally	sustainable,	and	is	not	inher-
ently	cruel.	Conversely,	opponents	of	the	hunt	callously	disregard	the	needs	of	the	
“sealers”	of	Atlantic	Canada	and	are	irrational	and	overly	emotional	when	it	comes	
to	the	defense	of	animals	that	are	also	a	sustainable	economic	resource.	Opponents	
of	the	hunt	contend	that	it	is	cruel	and	of	a	very	limited	economic	benefit.	For	hunt	
opponents,	the	hunt	is	a	savage	anachronism.	
	 Both	positions	have	some	empirical	support.	As	noted	above,	the	seal	hunt	
has	continued	at	various	levels	of	intensity	for	over	400	years,	and	continues	to	
provide	limited	economic	benefit	for	both	the	participants	and	Atlantic	Canada.	
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Sumner	(1983)	contends	that	the	“total	annual	gross	income	for	all	participants	has	
varied…from	$3	million	to	$5	million	(in	Canadian	dollars),	depending	largely	on	
pelt	prices	(Sumner,	1983,	p.	111).”	The	hunt	gross	income	is	unequally	distrib-
uted,	with	those	working	on	large	vessels	(over	65	feet)	earning	between	$2400-
$4800	per	participant	(and	comprising	about	4	percent	of	all	“sealers”);	smaller	
vessel	sealers	(vessels	between	35	and	65	feet)	earned	between$1300-$1900	per	
participant	(and	comprising	about	9	percent	of	all	“sealers”);	the	landsmen	earn	
the	least	(between	$230-$450	per	participant)	while	making	up	the	vast	majority	
of	“sealers”	(approximately	85	percent)	(Sumner,	1983,	pp.	111-112).	The	costs	
of	the	hunt	are	also	unequally	distributed:	according	to	a	1976	survey	(conducted	
before	the	EU	economic	ban)	the	expenses	of	the	hunt	lowered	the	income	of	the	
small	vessels	by	30	percent	and	the	landsmen	by	50	percent.	According	to	Sumner,	
“[c]ollectively,	 the	small	vessels	actually	operated	at	a	 loss”	 (Sumner,	1983,	p.	
112).	The	Canadian	government,	primarily	through	the	Ministry	of	Fisheries	and	
Oceans,	spends	“conservatively	at	$1	million	per	annum”	through	the	regulation	
of	the	seal	hunt,	publishing	information	regarding	the	hunt,	and	maintaining	the	
Ottawa-based	center	related	to	the	seal	hunt.	Sumner	also	suggests	that	the	total	
annual	added	value	of	the	seal	hunt	generated	by	both	the	“sealers”	and	the	second-
ary	sectors	(that	primarily	process	seal	pelts,	meat,	and	blubber)	varies	between	$5	
to	$10	million	dollars;	specifically	in	Newfoundland	the	primary	and	secondary	
sector	production	“constitutes	in	most	years	roughly	one-half	of	one	percent	of	the	
added	value	of	goods-producing	industries”	(Sumner,	1983,	p.	112).	
	 According	 to	 the	 Department	 of	 Oceans	 and	 Fisheries	 in	 their	 document	
“Socio-economic	Importance	of	the	Seal	Hunt”,	the	seal	hunt	provides	significant	
sources	of	income:	“In	Newfoundland	and	Labrador	at	least	7	costal	communities	
derived	between	15%	and	35%	of	 their	 total	earned	 income	from	sealing”	and	
“[s]ealers	state	their	income	from	sealing	can	represent	from	25-35%of	their	total	
annual	 income	(Socio-economic	 Importance	of	 the	Seal	Hunt).”	The	DFO	also	
states	that	the	seal	hunt	is	very	beneficial	for	“sealing	communities”	that	“do	not	
have	many	alternative	earnings	or	work	options	(Socio-economic	Importance	of	
the	Seal	Hunt).”	Unlike	Sumner	(1983),	these	data	are	not	discussed	in	terms	of	
distribution	of	earned	income	to	various	participants.	
	 Beyond	the	ambiguous	economic	benefits	of	the	seal	hunt,	the	“cruelty	ques-
tion”	is	of	significant	concern	both	to	the	Canadian	government	that	regulates	the	
seal	hunt	and	anti-hunt	activists.	Since	the	first	major	protests	began	in	the	1960s,	
films	and	still	images	of	seal	pups	being	killed	by	having	their	skulls	crushed	were	
very	significant	 in	raising	public	controversy	about	 the	apparent	cruelty	of	seal	
hunting	(and	contributed	to	the	European	Union	banning	importation	of	products	
produced	from	hooded	and	harp	seals).	Supporters	of	the	hunt	have	responded	that	
the	methods	of	killing	seals,	while	visually	unsettling,	are	effective	in	killing	seals	
nearly	instantaneously	and	therefore	eliminating	the	possibility	of	suffering	(and	also	
being	equivalent	to	other	forms	of	dispatching	commonly	employed	on	domestic	
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animals	raised	for	slaughter,	such	as	cows	and	pigs).	Moreover,	since	the	late	1970s,	
the	Canadian	Veterinary	Medical	Association	(CVMA)	has	become	involved	in	
the	assessment	of	the	seal	hunt	related	to	animal	welfare	(and	veterinarians	were	
involved	in	some	assessment	in	the	Gulf	in	the	mid	1960s	and	the	Front	in	the	early	
1970s)	(Daoust,	et	al,	2002,	p.	688).	These	assessments	address	whether	or	not	seals	
are	killed	“humanely”	(meaning	that	death	is	caused	instantaneously,	or	nearly	so).	
Daoust,	et	al	(2002)	state	 that	 the	Department	of	Fisheries	and	Oceans	Canada	
(DFO)	“has	adopted	a	series	of	regulations	aimed	at	promoting	humane	methods	
of	killing	seals”	 including	regulating	“the	minimum	and	maximum	dimensions	
of	both	the	club	and	the	hakapik,	and	the	minimum	caliber	of	rifle	and	minimum	
bullet	velocity	that	can	be	used	(Daoust,	et	al,	2002,	p.	688).”	The	intent	of	these	
regulations	is	to	insure	the	swift	death	of	hunted	seals	before	they	are	skinned.		
Beyond	the	regulation	of	slaughter	itself,	the	seal	hunt	is	also	observed	by	both	
representatives	of	the	CVMA	and	the	IFAW,	largely	to	determine	if	seals	are	killed	
swiftly	enough	as	to	conform	to	the	DFO	regulations.	As	two	measures	of	the	ef-
ficacy	of	the	DFO	regulations	Daoust,	et	al	(2002)	discuss	“7	skulls	from	carcasses	
of	recently	killed	seals”	taken	from	a	2001	seal	hunt	and	an	analysis	by	Daoust	and	
Crook	of	“4	of	11	videotapes	of	the	2001	hunt	in	the	Gulf,	taken	from	helicopters	
by	members	of	the	International	Fund	for	Animal	Welfare	(IFAW)	and	submitted	
on	an	unsolicited	basis	to	the	CVMA’s	Animal	Welfare	Committee”	(Daoust,	et	
al,	2002,	p.	688).	Daoust,	et	al	state	that	“[t]hese	4	videotapes	involved	a	total	of	
116	interactions	between	harp	seals	and	sealers,	or	37.4%	of	a	total	of	310	such	
interactions	recorded	in	the	11	videotapes”	(Daoust,	et	al,	2002,	p.	688).	These	
tapes	suggest	that	a	minority	of	the	videotaped	actions	may	have	been	violations	
of	DFO	regulations:
In	the	4	videotapes	examined	by	both	parties,	members	of	the	IFAW	considered	that	
55	violations	pertaining	directly	to	animal	welfare	issues	and	involving	39	(33.6%)	
of	116	seals	had	occurred.	Daoust	and	Crook	agreed	with	13	(23.6%	of	these	55	
alleged	violations,	involving	12	(10.3%)	of	116	seals.	(Daoust,	et	al,	2002,	p.	690)
The	7	skulls	that	were	collected	indicated	severe,	traumatic,	significant	damage	that	
was	sufficient	to	cause	instant	death	and	therefore	kept	with	DFO	regulations.
	 	The	evidence	supporting	the	claims	of	Daoust,	et	al	(2002)	that	“the	large	
majority	of	seals	taken	during	this	hunt	are	killed	in	an	acceptably	humane	man-
ner”	(Daoust,	et	al,	2002,	p.	693)	remains	ambiguous.	Daoust,	et	al	(2002)	state	
that	“[m]ost	hunters	recorded	on	videotapes	taken	by	the	IFAW	members	during	
the	2001	hunt	in	the	Gulf	failed	to	palpate	the	skull	or	check	the	corneal	reflex	
before	proceeding	to	hook	or	bleed	the	seal,	or	go	to	another	seal”	(Daoust,	et	al,	
2002,	p.	693),	which	is	necessary	to	determine	that	the	seals	in	question	are	dead	
and	not	merely	injured	and	suffering.	Moreover,	the	contents	of	the	7	of	the	11	
aforementioned	 videotapes	were	 not	 analyzed	 and	 discussed,	meaning	 that	 the	
majority	of	the	sample	discussed	by	Daoust	and	Crook	(approximately	63	percent	
Brian Lowe 77
of	the	total	videotaped	materials)	remains	unknown	and	possibly	contains	more	
significant	violations	of	DFO	regulations.	While	Daoust,	et	al	(2002)	maintain	that	
“[t]he	wide	open	nature	of	the	habitat	where	the	harp	seal	hunt	occurs	has	made	
it	particularly	amenable	to	intense	scrutiny”	(Daoust,	et	al,	2002,	p.	693),	Sumner	
(1983)	is	more	skeptical.	While	noting	that	“[f]isheries	officers	who	enforce	the	
regulations	are	empowered	 to	suspend	 the	 license	of	any	sealer	observed	 to	be	
breaking	them”	and	that	“according	to	some	observers,	95	percent	of	all	killings	
are	carried	out	properly”,	other	observers	have	stated	that	“breaches	of	the	regula-
tions	are	much	more	common”	(Sumner,	1983,	p	115).	Sumner	also	suggests	that,	
despite	the	“wide	open	nature	of	the	habitat	where	the	harp	seal	hunt	occurs”	that	
“the	hunt	is	inherently	difficult	to	regulate.	A	handful	of	Fisheries	officers	and	au-
thorized	observers	cannot	adequately	monitor	the	activities	of	thousands	of	sealers	
distributed	over	thousands	of	square	miles	of	open	ice”	(Sumner,	1983,	p.	115).	
	 Compounding	the	difficulties	inherent	in	a	ratio	of	the	small	number	of	observ-
ers	related	to	a	much	larger	number	of	sealers	is	the	potential	for	DFO	officials	to	
be	unduly	influenced	by	their	relationships	with	the	sealers.	For	example,	Eisnitz	
(1997)	contends	that	within	the	contemporary	American	slaughterhouse	industry	
(most	 of	which	 are	 located	 in	 rural	 areas	where	 the	 slaughterhouses	 employ	 a	
significant	portion	of	the	population),	federal	regulators	are	under	economic	and	
informal	pressures	via	relationships	to	others	in	their	community	to	not	be	zeal-
ous	of	enforcement	of	either	health	and	safety	or	humane	slaughter	regulations.	
Atlantic	Canada,	with	its	rural	populations	and	weak	economy,	provides	a	similar	
environment	within	which	DFO	and	CVMA	representatives	may	feel	pressured	to	
allow	actions	that	facilitate	the	seasonal	hunt	despite	their	officially	cruel	nature.
	 These	differences	provide	a	highly	conducive	environment	within	which	coun-
tervailing	efforts	at	moralization	to	occur.	Supporters	of	the	seal	hunt	may	point	to	
discernable	economic	benefits	derived	from	the	hunt	and	scientific	data	that	indicates	
that	the	seal	hunt	is	conducted	in	a	humane	manner	certified	by	veterinarians	and	
representatives	of	the	Canadian	government.	Opponents	of	the	hunt	may	raise	sub-
stantive	questions	about	the	economic	benefits	derived	from	the	seal	hunt	(and	the	
real	potential	for	economic	harm	caused	by	international	boycotts	created	by	states	
and	non-state	actors	to	the	Canadian	economy	because	of	the	seal	hunt)	and	may	
point	to	weak	measures	and	enforcement	of	humane	regulations	of	the	hunt	that	could	
fail	more	rigorous	ethical	tests.	In	sum,	neither	side	in	the	seal	hunt	controversy	can	
easily	fall	on	scientific	or	economic	data	to	irrefutably	defend	its	position.	
	 The	continuing	nature	of	the	seal	hunt	controversy	may	also	be	viewed	in	terms	
of	Rozin’s	three	general	categories	of	factors	conducive	or	inhibiting	moralization.	In	
terms	of	centrality of values and beliefs,	each	side	in	the	controversy	reveals	differing	
value	systems	and	the	place	of	the	seal	hunt	within	it.	For	hunt	defenders,	the	tradi-
tion	of	the	seal	hunt	meshes	well	with	both	a	cultural	history	and	economic	reality	
of	utilizing	both	natural	resources	and	nonhuman	animals	for	economic	subsidence.	
For	the	hunt	opponents,	the	hunt	reveals	post-materialist	values	(Inglehart,	1997)	
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in	which	nonhuman	animals	and	the	natural	environment	are	given	greater	priority	
as	objects	of	concern,	and	are	likely	to	be	found	in	populations	that	are	relatively	
economically	secure	and	well-integrated	into	their	host	society	(Jasper,	1997).	Re-
lated	to	this,	targeted populations	are	also	highly	significant.	As	Lee	(1988)	notes,	
many	in	Atlantic	Canada	are	“proudly”	unsentimental	regarding	seal	pups	and	other	
nonhuman	animals;	for	hunt	opponents,	the	inherent	beauty	and	innocence	of	the	
seals	in	their	natural	environment	make	them	very	sympathetic	objects	of	positive	
moral	concern.	(Images	and	films	of	the	hunt	have	also	been	central	in	presenting	
the	hunt	to	outsiders	and	casting	much	of	international	public	opinion	against	the	
hunt).	Finally,	the	structurally conducive or inhibiting societal conditions	serve	to	
fuel	the	controversy:	for	those	involved	in	the	seal	hunt,	economic	need,	tradition	
and	scientific	evidence	serve	to	reinforce	the	legitimacy	of	this	longstanding	prac-
tice.	Conversely,	significant	questions	regarding	the	economic	utility	and	ecological	
sustainability	of	the	seal	hunt—along	with	well-founded	concerns	about	cruelty	in	
the	hunt—emerge	in	a	context	in	a	time	period	when	others	that	utilize	nonhuman	
animals	are	coming	under	increasing	ethical	and	legal	scrutiny	(see	Lowe,	2006).	
	 Beyond	the	defenders	and	detractors	of	the	seal	hunt,	the	major	concern	for	
both	sides	is	shaping	the	public	moral	imagination	regarding	the	seal	hunt	into	one	
of	two	mutually	exclusive	visions.	The	processes	by	which	this	struggle	occurs	will	
be	the	focus	of	the	remainder	of	this	article	(see	Table	One:	Synthesizing	Variables	
in	Moralization).	One	of	the	core	issues	in	forging	sociological	explanations	of	
morality	is	the	“agency-structure	question”	(for	example,	see	Giddens,	1984):	how	
much	of	these	efforts	are	the	consequence	of	activities	of	social	actors	like	moral	
entrepreneurs,	and	how	much	of	these	endeavors	can	be	attributed	to	structural	and/or	
societal	conditions,	such	as	anomie?	In	addition	to	these	general	parameters,	the	
general	cultural	and	symbolic	landscape	of	the	host	society	is	also	likely	to	prove	
significant	in	accounting	for	the	relative	success	or	failure	of	a	moralizing	effort.	
Therefore,	the	variables	below	have	been	divided	into	agency-focused,	structurally	
focused,	and	culturally	focused	categories.
Agency-Focused Variables
	 These	are	variables	that	attribute	much	of	moralization	to	the	efforts	of	groups	
and/or	organizations	that	have	acted	in	some	fashion	in	order	to	promote	a	particular	
effort	at	moralization.
 Moral entrepreneurs/moral claimsmakers:	Who	or	what	 are	making	moral	
claims?	These	claims-makers	may	be	involved	in	perpetuating	a	moral	panic	(al-
though	they	are	not	necessary;	(see	Goode	&	Ben	Yehuda	(1994))	or	a	prolonged	
campaign	(for	example,	see	“Technicians	in	Moral	Outrage”	in	Jackall	&	Hirota,	
2000).	Moral	entrepreneurs	may	be	institutions	or	organizations,	such	as	the	DFO	
and	IFAW,	or	they	may	be	individuals.
	 Resistance of object(s) of fear:	To	what	degree	are	those	targeted	by	moraliza-
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tion	able	to	offer	resistance	or	do	third	parties	offer	resistance	or	counter-examples	
(Glassner,	1999)?
Structurally-Focused Variables
	 These	are	variables	dealing	primarily	with	supra-personal	conditions	and	phenom-
ena,	like	economic	activity	or	patterns	of	immigration,	which	may	encourage	or	inhibit	
attempts	at	moralization	because	of	the	societal	stability	that	they	facilitate	or	erode.	
 Intersection with media, legal and political structures 
 
Primary audience(s) 
of panic/crusade 
Objects of 
Fear/Objects of 
Compassion 
Counter-narrative 
Resistance by 
Object(s) of Fear 
 
 
Primary Moral 
Vocabulary 
 
Moral Entrepreneurs / 
Moral Claimsmakers 
 
Creation of 
Narrative 
Table One: Synthesizing Variables in Moralization
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 Primary audience(s) of the panic(s):	Who	or	what	groups,	populations,	net-
works,	subcultures,	are	most	likely	to	accept	the	moral	claims	being	generated?	
This	category	may	also	consider	potential	populations	that	may	come	to	accept	
claims	and/or	panic(s).	
 Status of moralization narrative within the host society:	To	what	degree	is	the	
moralization	narrative	granted	legitimacy	as	legitimate,	or	is	it	ridiculed	outside	
of	networks	of	supporters?
 Capacity to (re)form moral boundaries:	To	what	degree	can	the	moralization	
narrative	be	incorporated	within	existing	moral	boundaries?
Culturally Focused Variables
	 Variables	 in	 this	 category	 refer	 to	 the	 cultural	 and	 symbolic	 patterns	 and	
tendencies	within	a	society,	both	historical	and	contemporary,	that	may	serve	to	
encourage	or	inhibit	an	attempt	at	moralization.	These	variables	may	be	especially	
noteworthy	because,	as	Rozin	notes,	the	ability	for	a	new	idea	or	claim	(such	as	
emphasizing	the	importance	of	cleanliness)	to	be	introduced	into	the	host	society	
may	be	significantly	enhanced	if	it	may	be	attached	to	another	well-established	and	
accepted	idea	or	claim	(such	as	cleanliness	being	next	to	godliness).
	 Capacity for resistance:	This	category	of	variables	refers	to	behavior	often	
overlooked	in	the	moral	panics	literature,	namely	how	a	group,	subculture,	and/or	
organization	has	the	capacity	to	resist	attempts	at	either	moralizing	it	or	objects,	
practices,	and/or	phenomena	associated	with	it.	For	example,	Glantz	and	Balbach	
(2000)	note	that	the	tobacco	industry	has	been	very	adept	at	resisting	attempts	to	
moralize	either	cigarette	smoking	or	itself	as	anything	other	than	a	group	of	legiti-
mate	businesses	providing	products	that	adults	desired.
 Primary object(s) of fear:	Who	or	what	is	perceived	as	destructive	(and	why).	
For	example,	Solomon	(2005)	notes	that	those	who	promote	American	military	
intervention	tend	to	demonize	leaders	of	countries	targeted	for	invasion	as	being	
sexually	and	religiously	depraved	and	living	in	luxury.
 Primary object(s) of concern/compassion:	Who	or	what	is	to	be	protected	and	
why	(i.e.,	what	is	the	nature	of	the	perceived	threat?)?	Many	moral	panics	are	as-
sociated	with	groups	or	objects	associated	with	the	young	and/or	the	future	(such	
as	concerns	over	the	impact	of	music	or	video	games	on	children).	
	 Activated symbols and meanings:	This	group	of	variables	is	also	a	significant	
departure	because	it	recognizes	that	many	attempts	at	moralization	are	deliberate	
attempts	to	suppress,	undermine,	or	support	some	type	of	symbol	or	meaning.	
For	example,	in	the	above	discussion	of	the	Gennerelli	head	injury	laboratory,	
the	ALF	deftly	undermined	the	status	of	the	researchers	as	knowledgeable	and	
skilled	scientists	and	instead	portrayed	them	through	their	edited	research	tapes	
as	callous	and	sloppy.	
	 In	the	case	of	the	Canadian	seal	hunt,	images	of	seals	being	killed	has	evoked	
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controversy	for	decades,	and	placed	hunt	defenders	in	a	difficult	position.	Possibly	
as	a	consequence,	the	DFO	has	restricted	the	hunting	of	seal	pups.	According	to	
DFO	Minister	Regan,	only	the	“independent”	seals	“no	longer	part	of	a	family	
unit”	may	be	hunted:	
My	department	has	strict	conservation	measures	in	place,	and	is	committed	to	
the	careful	management	of	all	seals	to	ensure	strong,	healthy	populations	in	the	
years	to	come.	The	seals	hunted	are	self-reliant,	independent	animals	that	must	
already	have	molted	 their	white	coat	before	being	hunted.	They	are	no	 longer	
part	of	a	family	unit.	Hunting	for	harp	(whitecoat)	and	hooded	(blueback)	seal	
pups	is	strictly	prohibited,	as	is	the	trade,	sale	or	barter	of	the	fur	of	these	pups.	
(Regan,	March	17,	2005)
This	statement	is	noteworthy	because	it	simultaneously	acknowledges	the	public	
appeal	of	the	seal	pups	while	providing	rationalizations	for	killing	their	less	pho-
togenic	kin.
Association of Narrative with High Status Persons or Groups
	 To	what	 degree	 do	 legitimate	 institutions	 and/or	 persons	 accept,	 reject,	 or	
remain	neutral	towards	the	moralization	campaign?	Are	moral	claims	facilitated	or	
inhibited	because	high	status	persons	or	groups	support	or	malign	these	attempts	
at	moralization?	For	example,	the	roles	of	prominent	individuals	in	the	seal	hunt	
controversy.	Well-known	actors	such	as	Brigitte	Bardot,	Pamela	Anderson,	and	musi-
cians	including	Sir	Paul	McCartney	and	Morrissey	have	employed	their	prominence	
and	status	to	lend	attention	and	credibility	to	the	seal	hunt	protests	(Pilieci,	2006,	p.	
A6).	As	noted,	the	primary	contact	that	the	vast	majority	of	Canadians	and	others	
have	with	the	seal	hunt	is	through	mediated	reports	and	material	presented	by	the	
advocacy	organizations.	Therefore,	the	presence	of	one	or	more	media	noteworthy	
persons	will	serve	to	both	bring	additional	attention	to	the	issues(s)	at	hand	and	to	
potentially	lend	support	to	their	cause.	In	the	case	of	Anderson,	for	example,	her	
participation	as	grand	marshal	of	the	Grey	Cup	parade	in	2005	may	serve	to	bring	
the	messages	 she	 espouses	 to	 audiences	not	previously	 concerned	with	 animal	
welfare	or	rights	(Pilieci,	2006,	p.	A6).
	 For	anti-hunt	advocates,	the	danger	of	high	status	persons	challenging	the	hunt	
is	that	they	may	be	discredited	as	either	ignorant	or	emotional.	For	example,	in	his	
ethnography	of	a	controversy	over	using	former	companion	animals	surrendered	
to	animal	shelters	in	biomedical	experimentation,	Groves	(1997)	notes	that	animal	
advocates	were	deeply	concerned	with	being	characterized	as	being	perceived	by	
the	public	as	overly	emotional	or	sentimental	because	this	status	could	be	used	to	
discredit	the	activists	as	irrational.	Similarly,	the	participation	of	high	status	persons	
may	be	attacked	as	selfish	publicity	seeking.
	 High	 status	 persons	 may	 also	 make	 ambiguous	 contributions	 through	 the	
deployment	of	controversial	 language	or	 terms.	For	example,	 in	a	1997	Ottawa	
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Citizen	Newspaper	article,	environmentalist	Farley	Mowat	stated:	“I	don’t	think	the	
word	holocaust	is	too	strong”	in	reference	to	the	Canadian	seal	hunt,	also	noting:	
“I	do	not	make	a	distinction	between	the	massive	destruction	of	any	kind	of	animal	
whether	it	is	human	or	non-human”	(Ottawa Citizen,	1997,	p.	A4).	While	Mowat	
qualified	his	statement,	blaming	“government	manipulation”	for	much	of	the	“mass	
destruction”	of	the	hunt,	such	terms	may	anger	otherwise	sympathetic	segments	
of	the	public	that	decry	the	seal	hunt	but	understand	terms	such	as	“holocaust”	as	
overblown	and	disproportionate.
Intersection with Legal/Political Structures
	 To	what	degree	do	existing	structures	accept,	reject,	remain	neutral,	or	offer	
alternatives	to	the	moralization	narrative?	Are	these	claims	embraced,	modified,	
or	ignored?	In	the	case	of	the	Canadian	seal	hunt,	the	DFO	holds	a	monopoly	over	
definitions	of	“cruel”	and	“humane”	treatment	of	seals	and	can	increasingly	control	
the	presence	of	protesters	and/or	observers	during	the	seal	hunt.	Conversely,	anti-
seal	hunt	advocates	are	limited	to	their	own	means	of	communication,	information	
that	they	can	insert	in	the	press,	and	to	appeal	to	the	DFO	regarding	allegations	of	
cruelty	(wherein	the	DFO	is	the	ultimate	arbiter).
	 The	DFO	recognizes	that	the	potential	repercussions	of	negative	media	cover-
age	may	cause	difficulties	for	the	seal	hunt,	and	therefore	it	pursues	a	strategy	of	
claiming	an	economically	beneficial,	necessary,	and	environmental	seal	hunt,	while	
attacking	seal	hunt	opponents	as	overly	emotional	and	consciously	manipulative.	
For	example,	Minister	Geoff	Regan’s	March	17,	2005	statement	“Canada’s	Seal	
Hunt:	Beyond	the	Rhetoric”	is	noteworthy	because	it	implies	that,	because	that	the	
DFO	regulates	and	enforces	the	seal	hunt,	it	must	be	ethically	and	environmentally	
sustainable.	The	seal	hunt	is	defended	as	traditional	and	an	economic	necessity	while	
protesters	are	framed	as	irrational	and	a	threat	to	“Canada’s	reputation	abroad”:	
Like	the	fishery,	the	annual	seal	hunt	is	an	important	industry	and	a	time-honoured	
tradition	for	people	in	Canada’s	coastal	communities.	Seals	are	a	valuable	natural	
resource	that	provide	income	in	remote	towns	and	villages	where	few	other	eco-
nomic	opportunities	exist.	
	 Unfortunately,	this	industry	and	its	importance	to	thousands	of	Canadians	
are	often	misunderstood	and	clouded	by	misleading	rhetoric	and	sensational	im-
ages	that	tell	a	selective,	biased,	and	often	false	story	about	the	seal	hunt.	The	
tragic	result	is	that	this	industry,	and	the	people	who	rely	on	it	for	a	living,	are	
undeservedly	cast	in	a	negative	light	by	a	few	powerful	organizations	putting	their	
own	agendas	ahead	of	the	truth….
	 All	Canadians	need	to	understand	that	sealing	is	a	legitimate,	sustainable	activ-
ity	based	on	sound	conservation	principles.	The	hunt	is	conducted	in	a	humane	and	
tightly	regulated	manner.	Canada’s	seal	population	is	healthy	and	abundant.	Current	
estimates	put	the	harp	seal	herd—the	most	important	seal	herd	for	this	industry—in	
excess	of	five	million	animals,	nearly	triple	what	it	was	in	the	1970s….
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	 To	prevent	inhumane	treatment,	seals	are	killed	quickly	and	according	to	strict	
regulations.	Canada’s	seal-hunting	methods	have	been	studied	and	approved	by	
the	Royal	Commission	on	Seals	and	Sealing,	which	found	that	the	methods	used	
in	the	seal	hunt	compare	favourably	to	those	used	to	hunt	other	wild	animals,	and	
those	used	to	slaughter	domestic	animals—like	cattle	and	poultry—for	human	
consumption.	In	2002,	 the	Canadian	Veterinary	Medical	Association	(CVMA)	
issued	a	Special Report on Animal Welfare and the Harp Seal Hunt in Atlantic 
Canada,	which	concluded	that	virtually	all	harp	seals—fully	98	per	cent—are	
killed	in	a	humane	manner.	
	 It	is	especially	disturbing	that	some	organizations	are	seeking	to	damage	a	
legitimate	Canadian	activity	and	Canada’s	reputation	abroad	in	public-relations	
campaigns	in	order	to	raise	money	for	their	organizations.
	 The	sensational	images	and	breathless	rhetoric	used	to	criticize	this	industry	
amount	to	a	slap	in	the	face	to	the	thousands	of	families	who,	through	the	genera-
tions,	have	made	their	living	from	this	resource.	It	is	a	real	disgrace	to	have	such	
negative	light	being	cast	on	the	Canadian	men	and	women	of	this	industry,	and	
on	the	many	proud	coastal	communities	that	rely	on	the	seal	hunt	for	their	very	
survival.	Worse,	these	carefully	orchestrated	public-relations	campaigns	twist	the	
facts	of	the	seal	hunt	for	the	benefit	of	a	few	extremely	powerful	and	well-funded	
organizations.	(Regan,	March	17,	2005)
Capacity for Narratives and Counter-Narratives
	 In	media-saturated	post-industrial	societies,	the	capacity	to	couch	moralizing	
efforts	within	a	compelling	narrative	form	cannot	be	ignored.	For	example,	Cornog	
(2004)	argues	that	successful	American	presidential	candidates	have	utilized	crafted	
narratives	in	pursuit	of	support	from	the	electorate.	A	comprehensive	narrative	for	
a	moralization	also	allows	for	the	suppression	or	concealment	of	discrepancies	in	
data	or	behavior	that	may	threaten	public	support	and/or	alliances.	For	example,	the	
discourse	surrounding	“compassionate	conservatism”	produced	by	the	George	W.	
Bush	presidency	promoted	“people	of	faith”	working	in	concert	towards	alleviat-
ing	societal	problems	that	were	not	being	adequately	addressed	by	state	or	federal	
governments.	The	utility	of	the	term	“people	of	faith”	is	that	it	both	glosses	over	
doctrinal,	ideological,	and	organizational	differences	between	religious	groups	in	
an	attempt	to	build	a	coalition	that	will	continue	to	support	the	domestic	initiatives	
of	the	George	W.	Bush	administration	and	also	implicitly	promote	motifs	from	the	
“culture	wars”	of	religious	groups	being	at	odds	from	secular	ones.	
Creation of Narrative
	 How	is	the	moralized	object,	practice,	or	phenomena	organized	into	a	coher-
ent	narrative	that	is	accepted	by	(at	least	portions	of)	a	broader	audience?	In	sum,	
does	 the	 proposed	 moralized	 practice	 (such	 banning	 or	 labeling	 video	 games	
deemed	violent	or	sexually	explicit)	integrate	itself	with	a	broader	worldview	or	
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set	of	practices	(such	as	banning	or	limiting	the	exposure	of	children	to	violent	or	
sexually	explicit	films	or	magazines)?	
Intersection of Narrative with Dominant Moral Resources
and Myths of the Host Society
	 The	degree	to	which	the	narrative	created	by	the	moral	entrepreneurs	meshes	
with	or	contradicts	broader	themes	and	symbols	within	the	broader	society,	making	
the	narrative	more	or	less	readily	understood.	For	example,	Kean	(1998)	contends	
that	many	Victorian-era	supporters	of	animal	protection	were	also	involved	with	
other	types	of	social	reforms	that	were	informed	by	their	Protestant	Christianity,	so	
that	animal	protection	was	part	of	a	composite	rather	than	an	aberration	for	these	
moral	entrepreneurs.	
	 In	the	case	of	the	anti-hunt	advocates,	a	synthesis	of	anti-cruelty	and	environ-
mental	moral	resources	deeply	informs	the	anti-hunt	narrative.	For	example,	in	a	
1999	interview	with	the	Ottawa	Citizen,	the	IFAW	national	director	challenged	a	
federal	government	decision	to	maintain	the	seal	hunt	quota	at	275,000:
“I’m	not	sure	whose	advice	the	minister	has	been	heeding,	but	it	isn’t	the	scientific	
community’s.	This	is	completely	irresponsible,”	said	IFAW	national	director	Rick	
Smith.	“It’s	clear	the	government	has	just	thrown	the	science	out	the	window	and	
has	learned	nothing	from	the	collapse	of	the	cod	stocks,”	he	charged….
	 In	addition	to	a	handful	of	environmental	groups,	22	Canadian	scientists—in-
cluding	11	from	Newfoundland’s	Memorial	University—have	asked	for	the	reduc-
tion	of	the	size	of	the	hunt	to	protect	the	health	of	the	seal	herd.	
	 One	of	those	scientists,	Dr.	David	Lavigne,	of	Guelph,	recently	co-authored	a	
study	of	Canada’s	hunt	management	practices	between	1996	and	1998.	The	study,	
published	this	fall	in	the	peer-reviewed	journal	Conservation	Biology,	found	that	
the	Canadian	and	Greenlandic	hunts,	which	prey	on	the	same	seal	population,	
exceeded	the	herd’s	ability	to	replenish	its	numbers	through	reproduction.
	 The	scientists	estimate	that	1.5	to	5.9	times	more	seals	are	now	being		killed	
than	born	each	year.
	 “Viewed	from	this	perspective,	Canada’s	approach	to	harp	seal	management	
between	1996	and	1998	cannot	be	deemed	precautionary	or	risk	averse,”	the	authors	
conclude.	(Duffy,	1999,	p.	A9)
The	meshing	of	the	overt	advocate’s	claim	with	peer-reviewed	data	generated	by	
apparently	disinterested	scientists	serves	to	support	the	environmental	basis	of	the	
anti-seal	narrative.
	 Another	tactic	to	discredit	the	seal	hunt	has	been	to	depict	it	as	“un-Canadian,”	
Canadians	have	distinguished	themselves	from	other	nations	(especially	the	United	
States)	through	its	international	humanitarian	efforts,	humane	domestic	policies,	
and	 respect	 for	 human	 rights.	 In	 characterizing	 the	 seal	 hunt	 as	 antithetical	 to	
this	 imagined	 national	 character	 (see	Anderson,	 1991)	 raises	 the	 possibility	 of	
international	embarrassment	as	another	blow	against	 the	 legitimacy	of	 the	 seal	
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hunt.	For	example,	in	2006,	British	singer	Morrissey,	in	announcing	that	his	tour	
would	not	include	any	Canadian	stops,	made	an	analogy	between	the	seal	hunt	and	
genocidal	activities	at	his	official	website:	“Constructing	of	German	gas	chambers	
also	provided	work	for	someone—this	is	not	a	moral	or	sound	reason	for	allowing	
suffering….The	Canadian	Prime	Minister	says	the	so-called	‘cull’	is	economically	
and	environmentally	justified,	but	this	is	untrue.”	Morrissey	also	compared	Canada	
to	China	“as	the	cruelest	and	most	self-serving	nation”	(Pilieci,	2006,	p.A4)
Intersection of Narrative with Media
	 What	type	of	media	coverage	is	given	to	the	moralizing	narrative,	and	how	
transposable	 is	 that	 narrative	 to	 media	 coverage?	As	 Jamieson	 and	Waldman	
(2003)	argue,	media	coverage	necessitates	some	type	of	narrative;	 the	question	
is	to	what	degree	is	this	narrative	favorable	to	moralization.	As	the	above-quoted	
article,	“Unchanged	seal	quota	worries	conversationalists”	suggests,	environmen-
tal	claims—especially	those	that	can	be	supported	by	non-advocates—are	easily	
disseminated	into	a	journalistic	narrative	that	provides	credibility	for	the	anti-seal	
hunt	narrative.	
	 In	moralization	campaigns,	the	intentions	of	the	creators	of	media	artifacts	are	
not	automatically	transmitted	within	the	artifacts	themselves.	As	noted,	the	seal	
hunt	controversy	began	with	a	film	made	to	bolster	fur	consumption.	A	more	recent	
example	of	a	mediated	artifact	deployed	far	from	its	creator’s	intentions	is	a	video	
featuring	the	wounded	and	captured	Lieutenant	Commander	John	McCain:	
The	opening	shot	of	a	new	video	about	Sen.	John	McCain	shows	a	young	Navy	pilot	
encased	in	a	giant,	clumsy-looking	plaster	cast.	With	his	one	free	hand,	he	smokes	a	
cigarette	as	he	gives	a	foreigner	interviewer	his	name,	rank	and	serial	number.
	 From	that	image	of	McCain,	badly	injured	from	a	plane	crash	and	captive	
in	a	Vietnamese	prisoner	of	war	camp,	the	title	flashes	over	the	sound	of	a	gong:	
Courageous	service.	Experienced	leadership.	Bold	solutions.
	 The	film	will	be	distributed	widely	today,	available	on	the	front	page	of	the	
website	for	the	Arizona	Republican’s	presidential	campaign;	screened	at	campaign	
events	in	Iowa,	South	Carolina	and	New	Hampshire;	and	handed	out	as	DVDs	to	
supporters.	In	12	minutes,	it	sketches	the	history	of	McCain’s	harrowing	experi-
ences	during	the	bombing	of	an	aircraft	carrier	and	as	a	prisoner	of	war,	drawing	
comparisons	between	his	courage	as	a	captive	pilot	and	his	abilities	as	a	leader.	
(Sanger-Katz,	August	30,	2007)
Presumably	McCain’s	North	Vietnamese	captors	did	not	intend	to	create	film	that	
could	be	utilized	to	bolster	the	future	Senator’s	political	campaigns;	however,	as	
Sanger-Katz	notes	this	footage	allows	McCain	to	emphasize	his	military	and	com-
bat	experiences.	Similarly,	cultural	artifacts	that	are	intended	to	promote	a	specific	
agenda	can	be	deployed	by	other	moral	entrepreneurs	in	a	variety	of	directions.	
	 The	perception	of	the	role	of	media	on	the	part	of	agents	within	moralization	
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struggles	can	also	play	a	significant	role	in	the	narrative	that	it	ultimately	created.	
For	example,	in	“Animal-rights	video	used	as	evidence	against	sealers,”	Prentice	
(1998)	discusses	how	a	four-person	television	crew	“gained	permission	to	accom-
pany	the	sealers,	on	condition	they	would	turn	off	their	video	cameras	when	asked	
to	do	so”	because	the	sealers	“thought	they	were	being	videotaped	for	a	U.S.	TV	
program	about	hunting”	 (Prentice,	1998,	p.	A7).	The	filmmakers	were	actually	
agents	of	the	IFAW.	This	deception	created	10	hours	of	videotape	of	the	1996	seal	
hunt	that	resulted	in	17	charges	against	the	sealers	featured	in	the	videotape	and	
was	characterized	by	the	IFAW	Canadian	director	as	“absolute	vindication	of	what	
we	have	been	saying	for	years	about	the	cruelty	of	the	hunt”	(Prentice,	1998,	p.	
A7).	While	the	fabrication	that	the	IFAW	employed	to	create	this	videotape	could	
be	attacked	as	deceptive	and	therefore	suspect,	Richard	Smith,	Canadian	Director	
of	the	IFAW,	argued	that	the	sealers	knew	they	could	ask	the	filmmakers	to	cease	
filming	during	the	seal	hunt	“was	an	indication	of	the	widespread	cruelty	that	oc-
curs	during	the	annual	slaughter”	(Prentice,	1998,	p.	A7).
	 Beyond	films	and	images	that	are	intentionally	created	to	be	persuasive,	jour-
nalists	striving	for	objectivity	in	reporting	the	seal	hunt	are	in	an	ethically	delicate	
situation,	as	described	by	photographer	Jonathan	Hayward	in	2005	in	an	article	in	
The Ottawa Citizen	that	was	accompanied	by	several	of	his	photographs:
The	annual	Atlantic	seal	hunt	is	upon	us,	and	once	again	we	are	assailed	with	im-
ages	that	batter	our	senses	and	our	sentiments.	Their	use	in	conventional	media	
is	usually	muted:	 small	photos	 rendered	 in	black	and	white.	On	animal	 rights	
websites,	however,	the	pictures	are	vivid,	viscous	and	bolstered	by	equally	graphic	
video	accounts.
	 The	photos	accompanying	this	story,	it	must	be	noted,	are	not	the	work	of	
a	propagandist,	but	a	Newfoundland-born	journalist	working	for	The	Canadian	
Press.	Printed	in	colour,	they	would	be	not	merely	disturbing,	but	sickening.	They	
are,	says	photographer	Jonathan	Hayward,	an	unvarnished	representation	of	one	
part	of	the	annual	harvest	of	seals	for	pelts	and	blubber….
	 Mr.	Hayward	is	a	veteran	newsman,	based	in	Ottawa	and	used	to	taking	photos	
that	can	make	politicians	look	good,	bad	or	indifferent	by	turns	from	one	day	to	
the	next.	Taking	pictures	of	the	seal	hunt	is	different.
	 “As	a	photographer,	the	first	thing	you	want	to	be	is	unbiased.	You	don’t	want	
to	be	on	one	side	or	another,	whether	you’re	on	an	election	campaign	or	what,”	
said	Mr.	Hayward.	But	all	his	photos	of	the	seal	hunt	seem	judgmental	to	him,	
sensationalistic,	despite	his	best	efforts.	
	 “The	killing	of	anything	does	not	look	good…The	reason	I’ve	had	such	a	
hard	time	with	this	story	is	because	no	matter	what	you	do,	it	looks	negative,”	he	
said.	(Atherton,	2005,	p.	A1)	
Atherton	 (2005)	 states	 that	 “[t]he	 harvest	 on	 the	 ice-floes	 near	 Prince	Edward	
Island	accounts	for	about	20	per	cent	of	the	hunt”	where	clubs	are	utilized,	and	the	
other	80	percent	of	the	hunt	involves	rifles	“and	photos,	if	anyone	bothered	to	take	
them,	would	be	far	less	dramatic”	(Atherton,	2005,	p.	A1).	Even	if	these	images	are	
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empirically	disproportionate	in	representing	the	actual	mechanics	of	seal	hunting,	
they	raise	significant	ethical	concerns	about	objectivity:	if	images	are	upsetting	
to	an	audience	to	they	be	modified	(such	as	shrinking	or	removing	color)	or	are	
such	efforts	themselves	a	type	of	bias?	Animal	rights	advocates	historically	have	
found	 significant	 utility	 in	 promoting	visuals	 of	 animal	 suffering,	 complaining	
that	to	deliberately	suppress	or	dilute	such	images	would	be	concealing	the	real-
ity	of	animal	suffering	(especially	when	the	animals	themselves	cannot	verbalize	
their	condition).	In	the	case	of	the	Gennarelli	Head	Injury	clinic	at	the	University	
of	Pennsylvania,	Animal	Liberation	Front	(ALF)	members	compiled	a	30	minute	
video	 titled	 “Unnecessary	 Fuss”	 from	 over	 60	 hours	 of	 video	 tape	 created	 by	
Gennarelli’s	experiments	involving	induced	head	injuries	in	baboons	that	showed	
numerous	violations	of	the	Federal	Animal	Welfare	Act.	While	these	images	were	
defined	as	shocking,	they	also	documented	illegal	activities	that	had	occurred	in	
a	laboratory	that	was	receiving	approximately	a	million	dollars	annually	from	the	
National	Institute	of	Health.	Screenings	of	“Unnecessary	Fuss”	on	Capitol	Hill,	
along	with	segments	broadcast	on	the	NBC	“Nightly	News”	and	reported	on	in	the	
New York Times	and	Washington Post	became	significant	resources	in	the	effort	to	
close	Gennarelli	laboratory	(Finsen	and	Finsen,	1994,	pp.	67-71).
	 Animal	rights	and	environmental	advocates	are	certainly	not	the	only	claims-
makers	to	realize	the	significance	of	visual	 images	from	remote	places	that	are	
transmitted	to	potentially	sympathetic	audiences	in	the	post-industrial	world.	In	
one	case,	Amnesty	International	has	begun	the	“Eyes	on	Darfur”	campaign	in	order	
to	continue	to	bring	public	scrunity	to	the	alleged	ongoing	genocide	in	the	Darfur	
region	of	Sudan,	as	noted	by	Michele	Kelemen	of	National Public Radio:	
Using	a	Web	site	and	satellite	cameras,	Amnesty	International	USA	plans	to	track	
developments	in	12	at-risk	villages	by	sending	up-to-date	images	to	a	Web	site.	
	 The	human	rights	organization	hopes	its	“Eyes	on	Darfur”	project	will	help	
prevent	violence	before	it	happens,	and	compel	computer	users	worldwide	to	pres-
sure	the	country’s	president,	Omar	al-Bashir,	to	let	peacekeepers	into	the	country.	
(Kelemen,	June	6,	2007)
The	“Eyes	on	Darfur”	website	encourages	viewers	to	“Explore	the	satellite	evidence	
and	detailed	on-the-ground	information	and	see	with	your	own	eyes	what	is	hap-
pening	in	Darfur”	to	“Join	the	global	neighborhood	watch”	and	“Act	to	prevent	
further	attacks	by	monitoring	villages	with	high	risk”	(www.eyesondarfur.org/,	2	
September	2007).	Not	only	does	this	easily	accessible	information	allow	for	those	
outside	of	Durfur,	an	area	largely	inaccessible	to	outside	inspectors	and	observers,	
to	become	informed,	but	it	deliberately	intends	to	create	a	compelling	moral	drama	
for	viewers	who	are	encouraged	to	be	engaged	by	these	images	and	to	therefore	
become	politically	engaged	on	behalf	of	the	villagers	featured	on	the	website.	
 The	danger	inherent	in	the	utilization	of	graphic	or	compelling	images	carries	
with	it	the	danger	of	“compassion	fatigue.”	Moeller	(1999)	contends	that	such	images	
War for the Seals88
can	bring	unrivaled	individualized	attention	to	a	mass	event,	such	as	a	humanitarian	
crisis	or	the	slaughter	of	animals.	Conversely,	a	plethora	of	images	can	also	create	
passivity	in	audiences	because	the	suffering	in	question	seems	overwhelming	and	
unstoppable—which	is	likely	the	opposite	goal	of	advocates	that	present	such	im-
ages.	As	columnist	Jack	Payton	wrote	in	the	St.	Petersburg	Times	in	1991	after	a	
series	of	publicized	humanitarian	crises:	“Maybe	the	Kurds,	the	Bangladeshis,	the	
Ethiopians,	and	the	Mozambicans	have	finally	pushed	us	into	the	MEGO,	or	My	
Eyes	Glaze	Over	syndrome.	Maybe	Joseph	Stalin	was	right	after	all	when	he	said,	
‘One	death	is	a	tragedy,	1	million	deaths	is	a	statistic’”	(in	Moeller,	1999,	p.	36).
Mobilization of Counter-Narrative(s)
	 Are	counter	narratives	presented	which	try	to	undermine	the	moralization	narrative,	
or	offer	alternate	explanations	for	the	object	or	activities	in	question?	For	example,	
the	attempts	of	public	health	advocates	beginning	in	1964	to	create	a	public	problem	
around	smoking	was	weakened	by	a	tobacco	counter-narrative	of	uncertainty	(“we	
don’t	know	if	tobacco	causes	health	problems”)	and	individual	responsibility	(“if	there	
is	a	connection	between	smoking	and	health	problems,	tobacco	companies	are	not	
responsible	for	any	health	problems	subsequently	discovered	in	smokers;	individuals	
choose	to	smoke	and	therefore	assumed	the	risk”).
	 As	noted,	the	images	and	films	produced	by	anti-hunt	advocates	have	been	
detrimental	to	public	perceptions	of	the	hunt’s	legitimacy.	One	counter-narrative	
that	has	been	mobilized	 is	 to	emphasize	 the	 roles	of	 individual	seal	hunters.	A	
1928	film,	The Great Artic Seal Hunt	by	American	Varick	Frissell,	has	been	revived	
through	a	documentary	supported	by	the	Canadian	National	Film	Board.	The	docu-
mentary	emphasizes	Frissell’s	perception	of	the	seal	hunters	as	heroic,	providing	“a	
true	record	of	this	nation’s	heroism	against	the	terror	of	the	ice”	as	Frissell	wrote	
in	1928.	Kennedy	(2002)	captures	some	of	the	imagery	Frissell	produced	of	the	
Newfoundland	sealers	(with	a	strongly	pro-hunt	commentary):
With	an	artic	wind	slicing	over	them	from	above,	and	the	promise	of	icy	death	
dancing	up	from	below,	the	men	would	spread	out	over	the	frozen	ocean,	over	the	
rolling	white	wasteland	of	shifting	ice	chunks	and	uncertain	footing.	Arriving	by	
the	thousands	for	the	great	annual	seal	hunt,	they	were	me	driven	by	the	despera-
tion	of	poverty,	by	their	sense	of	adventure,	by	their	very	nature.	
	 They	were	Newfoundlanders.	Going	to	the	ice—“swilling”—was	their	rite	
of	heroic	passage,	a	stitch	in	the	fabric	of	their	identity.	
	 That	is	how	it	was	in	an	earlier	age.	Seventy	and	more	years	ago,	the	seal	
hunt	was	a	massive	thing,	not	at	all	like	today’s	much-reduced	version,	victim	of	
decades	of	animal-rights	activism	(Kennedy,	2002,	p.	C8).	
Kennedy’s	 interpretation	 of	 Frissell’s	 film	 is	 conveniently	 uncontested:	 Frissell	
was	killed	15	March	1931	on	Newfoundland’s	ice	floes	while	making	another	film	
about	the	sealers.	The	drama	of	the	screen	images	and	the	death	of	the	filmmaker	
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serve	to	propel	the	image	of	the	sealers	into	historic	icons.	The	antithesis	of	this	
icon:	animal	cruelty,	intractable	and	unaddressed	Atlantic	Canadian	poverty,	and	
the	possibility	of	environmental	destruction	are	ignored.	
	 Another	form	of	counter-narrative	is	to	directly	attack	the	anti-seal	advocates	as	
overly	emotional	and	irrational.	Alison	Beal,	Executive	director	of	the	Fur	Institute	
of	Canada,	in	a	letter	published	in	The Ottawa Citizen in	1997,	attacked	both	a	
prominent	musician	who	deplores	the	hunt	as	ignorant	and	the	anti-hunt	movement	
as	racist	and	deceptive:
The	International	Fund	for	Animal	Welfare	continues	to	attempt	to	reap	the	dollars	
with	their	new	anti-sealing	campaign,	launched	on	Oct.	9	in	Toronto.	Spending	vast	
sums	of	money	in	a	national	newspaper	and	television	campaign,	the	group	has	
recruited	prominent	Canadian	personalities	to	back	their	bogus	declarations.
	 Astonishingly,	the	stars	haven’t	bothered	to	verify	their	sources	of	information	
and	dutifully	spout	the	nonsense	fed	to	them	by	IFAW	leaders.	Even	more	surprising	
is	their	inability	to	use	a	little	critical	thinking	about	the	veracity	of	the	claims.
	 For	instance,	Loreena	McKennitt	expressed	her	horror	that	“seals	are	routinely	
skinned	alive”	without	wondering	 for	an	 instant	what	could	possibly	motivate	
someone	to	do	such	a	thing.	Working	out	at	sea,	in	harsh	and	dangerous	conditions	
of	the	Atlantic,	is	hard	enough	without	complicating	already	difficult	work	with	
senseless	and	irresponsible	cruelty.	The	allegation	is	preposterous;	its	endorsement	
contemptible….
	 The	real	clincher	comes	in	the	following	racist	comment,	“We	do	not	oppose	
subsistence	hunting	by	Inuit	people	or	others,	but	we	believe	that	the	commercial	
seal	hunt	is	abhorrent	and	wasteful.”	In	other	words,	it’s	quite	all	right	to	hunt	
seals	as	long	as	you	don’t	trade,	and	thus	the	Inuit	and	“others”	may	not	partici-
pate	in	local,	national	or	international	economies	but	rather	remain	economically	
disadvantaged	and	dependent	on	government	assistance	to	meet	their	needs….
	 Meanwhile,	people	in	costal	communities	continue	to	lose	their	livelihoods	
and	their	dignity	to	the	lies,	propaganda,	and	emotionalism	that	this	organization	
purveys	to	city	dwellers	who	only	think	they	care.	(Beal,	1997,	p.	A14)	
This	attack	(albeit	by	an	interested	party)	casts	the	anti-hunt	advocates	as	ill-informed	
urbanites	that	are	content	to	leave	the	Maritime	economy	in	ruins.	This	strategy	
also	deftly	avoids	the	need	to	address	questions	of	environmental	sustainability	or	
systemic	causes	of	Atlantic	Canadian	poverty	that	seal	hunting	does	not	resolve.
Conclusion
	 The	above	illustration	of	an	ongoing	campaign	of	sociological	warfare	suggests	
that,	without	a	significant	realignment	of	influence,	the	war	for	the	seals	appears	
to	be	at	a	stalemate.	The	seal	hunt	defenders,	while	controlling	the	legal	regulation	
of	the	hunt	and	increasingly	regulating	the	contact	of	anti-hunt	advocates	with	the	
seal	hunt,	are	unable	to	contain	animal	rights	sentiments	both	within	and	outside	
Canada	that	 the	hunt	 is	cruel	and	environmentally	unsustainable.	The	seal	hunt	
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defenders	are	also	unlikely	to	alter	European	Union	policies	that	would	allow	more	
products	from	the	seal	hunt	to	be	sold	(and	therefore	making	the	profits	generated	
by	the	seal	hunt	more	substantial).	Conversely,	anti-hunt	advocates	appear	to	have	
virtually	no	political	leverage	to	curtail	or	terminate	the	hunt;	the	effects	of	anti-
hunt	boycotts	of	Canadian	products	are	ambiguous	at	best.
	 As	a	critical	element	in	sociological	warfare,	moralization	is	centrally	important	
to	analyzing	the	activities	of	the	combatants	in	the	seal	war.	Anti-hunt	activists	have	
experienced	success	is	deploying	vivid	and	graphic	images	of	the	seal	hunt,	and	have	
also	enjoyed	the	added	testimony	of	celebrities	and	scientists	in	attacking	the	hunt.	
Hunt	defenders	also	have	the	authority	of	the	state,	scientific	experts	and	tradition	
(not	insignificant	in	a	society	increasingly	dominated	by	multicultural	discourse)	
to	bolster	the	moral	standing	of	the	hunt.	Furthermore,	Atlantic	Canada	itself	may	
be	juxtaposed	against	the	seals	as	sympathetic	and	compassionate	objects.	While	
moralization	in	this	conflict	plays	a	central	role,	it	does	not	appear	at	present	that	
either	side	has	an	overwhelming	moral	gravitas	that	alone	will	either	terminate	the	
hunt	or	the	protests	against	it.	
	 While	the	economic	needs	and	cultural	traditions	of	Atlantic	Canada	are	cited	
as	resources	for	continuing	the	seal	hunt,	the	actual	economic	benefits	of	the	seal	
hunt	to	the	mass	of	participants	and	the	surrounding	communities	is	also	ambigu-
ous,	and	an	emphasis	on	the	seal	hunt	may	forestall	more	sustained	efforts	to	ad-
dress	Atlantic	Canada’s	economic	difficulties.	Each	side	of	combatants	has	their	
own,	incompatible	terminology	which	serves	to	calcify	divisions	and	weaken	the	
possibility	of	any	“common	ground”	being	forged	between	the	combatants.	Un-
less	structural	conditions	change,	it	is	unlikely	that	this	impasse	will	be	breached.	
Growing	Russian	 incursions	 into	Canadian	arctic	 territory	may	bring	more	na-
tionalistic	sentiment	to	activities	in	northern	areas,	and	thus	add	additional	stigma	
to	those	who	oppose	the	seal	hunt	as	“anti-Canadian.”	Conversely,	such	pressures	
may	encourage	the	federal	government	to	curtail	support	for	the	hunt	in	favor	of	
funding	activities	in	the	Arctic.	The	current	economic	prosperity	that	Canada	is	
experiencing	also	plays	an	ambivalent	role	in	the	future	of	this	conflict.	With	more	
resources	generated	through	tax	revenue,	there	may	be	additional	encouragement	
to	preserve	the	seal	hunt	as	a	Canadian	tradition.	Conversely,	prosperity	(especially	
in	western	Canada)	may	erode	tolerance	for	support	of	a	region	that	is	chronically	
economically	anemic.	In	the	final	analysis,	the	moral	imagination	regarding	the	
seals	remains	unresolved.
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